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# Security Council

*Provisional*

Fifty-fifth year

**4223**rd meeting
Wednesday, 15 November 2000, 3 p.m.
New York

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| *President:* | Mr. van Walsum | (Netherlands) |
| *Members:* | Argentina | Mr. Listre |
| | Bangladesh | Mr. Chowdhury |
| | Canada | Mr. Heinbecker |
| | China | Mr. Wang Yingfan |
| | France | Mr. Levitte |
| | Jamaica | Mr. Ward |
| | Malaysia | Mr. Roslan |
| | Mali | Mr. Kassé |
| | Namibia | Mrs. Ashipala-Musavyi |
| | Russian Federation | Mr. Gatilov |
| | Tunisia | Mr. Ben Mustapha |
| | Ukraine | Mr. Yel'chenko |
| | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | Sir Jeremy Greenstock |
| | United States of America | Mr. Holbrooke |

## Agenda

No exit without strategy

Letter dated 6 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2000/1072).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

00-74851 (E)

*The meeting was resumed at 3.15 p.m.*

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Indonesia in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Widodo (Indonesia) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.*

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Germany. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Kastrup** (Germany): Mr. President, I should like to commend you and the Dutch delegation for having convened this thematic debate and for resuming our discussion punctually.

This debate is indeed timely. The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel on the reform of UN peacekeeping are on everybody's mind these days. The Security Council has just completed its work on its implementation document, and the General Assembly is still deliberating on the recommendations and will — hopefully — soon come up with a substantive document. Many of the report's recommendations are related to today's brainstorming — the quality of Security Council mandates, the comprehensive definition of peace operations, the timely deployment of adequately equipped troops, the efficient coordination of all actors, and a better flow of information.

In talking about an exit strategy, one should first define and agree on the term itself. What does it mean? The withdrawal of a mission in case of emergency? The transition from one type of peace operation to another? The gradual handover from United Nations to national or local responsibility? Or the assessment of the successful fulfilment of a mission's mandate?

Other multinational organizations or national bodies may have their own definition of "exit strategy", but the Security Council must have a clear one of its own. Workable mandates are not possible otherwise. There is no magic formula to ensure a perfect Security Council mandate, but there are elements which should be taken into account when drafting, changing or ending a Security Council mandate. It is clear that there are no standard models and that each actual or potential conflict requires its own analysis and response, as was rightly pointed out by our colleague, the representative of Bangladesh, this morning. Nevertheless, lessons learned have led to the following preliminary conclusions, which I should like to sum up in 10 points. Of course, as I am the 15th speaker, certain repetitions cannot be avoided.

First, before setting up, altering or ending a mandate, it is essential to have a clear, reliable assessment of the situation on the ground which is agreed upon by all important actors. The tools to achieve this objective include a special representative of the Secretary-General; close consultations with the affected Member States and potential or actual troop contributors; a strengthened capability on the part of the Secretariat — as pointed out by the representative of France this morning — to gather information, analyse and plan strategically; and close contacts with civil organizations on the ground. This requires a better linkage between the Security Council, troop contributors and countries contributing to policing and civilian operations.

Second, an integrated approach also means taking into account the repercussions for neighbouring countries of a mandate that is new, altered or has ended. This is a point that has not yet been touched on. In this context, I should like to remind the Council of the impact that the Security Council's mandates for Kosovo, Bosnia and Sierra Leone had on neighbouring countries in the respective regions.

Third, when altering or ending a mandate, a clear scenario and analysis of options must be put together to evaluate the consequences of the intended action.

Fourth, the provisions of the mandates have to be clear, credible and achievable, and they must provide for adequate resources.

Fifth, when a mission is to be reduced, withdrawn or terminated, a transparent and proper assessment of the achievement of the mission's goals must be undertaken.

Sixth, heads of any mission and their staff should remain focused and concentrated on achieving the defined goals and objectives of their mandate, resisting any temptations to gradually extend their authority and jurisdiction into areas that are not explicitly covered by the mandate. The experience of the United Nations-mandated operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good case to study to this end.

Seventh, mandates must include enough built-in flexibility so that corrections, adaptations to changing situations and fine tuning during the mission implementation is possible. Close cooperation and coordination between "ground zero" forces and headquarters is indispensable.

Eighth, while understanding the reasons for quick pull-outs, it is important to set high threshold criteria for withdrawals. The fact that the first elections have been held can seldom be the concluding point for peace operations. Elections can be held too soon in conflict-ridden societies or can result in even increased fragmentation of the societies. International monitoring must therefore often continue throughout the electoral process and even beyond in order to enable a smooth transition. Criteria for the achievement of a lasting, self-sustained peace are vague. However, they should include the rule of law and functioning of civil institutions.

Ninth, peace missions must be seen as a multifold continuum of tasks. Complex peace processes are getting more and more multidimensional. It is important to address the integrated tasks that stretch from conflict prevention all the way to peace-building. It is clear that in practice such clear distinctions do not occur. Overlapping tasks and multi-functional operations are the norm. The need for effective coordination of all potential actors and for integrated actions is therefore evident.

Tenth, specific components of post-conflict peace-building should therefore be included early on in peace agreements, when setting up new peace missions, but especially when concluding mandates. Without those elements the lasting success of peace missions cannot be expected. In preventing violent conflicts from re-emerging and in rebuilding the capabilities of a society to resolve conflicts without fighting, peace-building measures apply to situations where the worst has already happened, leaving behind traumas to heal, minefields to clear, infrastructure to rebuild, former combatants to disarm and refugees to repatriate. Other elements might include post-conflict governance, emergency assistance, first steps towards economic stabilization, health care and the coordination of international and local actors.

In concluding I would like to underline what I have said at the beginning. It is very encouraging that the Brahimi Panel and its implementation plan presented by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette have addressed many of the above-mentioned elements. We are looking forward to a speedy implementation of those recommendations. We also welcome the Security Council's resolution (resolution 1327 (2000)) on the implementation of those recommendations adopted last Monday. Germany has already, at the national level, started to implement a number of the Panel's recommendations: conclusion of a stand-by agreement, international training facilities for civilian peacekeepers, financial contribution to the trust fund on crisis prevention, strengthening of the Lessons Learned Unit and active contributions to peace-building. We are strongly committed to using the Brahimi Report (S/2000/809) to bring about major and much-needed changes in the way the United Nations carries out its responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability.

This morning the United States representative said that he would pray to continue this discussion in private meetings. Please, dear colleague, include us in your prayer.

**The President**: I invite the representative of Singapore to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Mahbubani** (Singapore): Before I begin my prepared remarks, I hope that you would allow me to add a brief impromptu comment. I was fortunate to be here at 1 p.m. today when Sir Jeremy Greenstock was speaking. I was actually very pleased that he was responding spontaneously and off the cuff to many of the comments that were made this morning, and I thought that this is the sort of interactive dialogue that we should encourage and have in the Security Council, because it is one way of ensuring that some of the good ideas that are put across in some of these open debates are not, in a sense, thrown into a big, black hole and forgotten, but are indeed bounced around and carried forward and will perhaps remain alive in subsequent meetings of the Security Council.

Please allow me now to begin formally by congratulating you, Sir, on your diplomatic dexterity. It is sometimes said that a diplomat is someone who can tell a person to go to hell in such a way that the person will feel that he is going to enjoy the journey. You have performed an equal miracle — on the positive side — by persuading the Council to discuss an issue that has become virtually taboo: the shortcomings and failures of the United Nations Security Council decision-making on peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations are the heart and soul of the work of this Council. It is the only activity for which the Security Council has a unique mandate. No other body can assume responsibility for peacekeeping operations. A quick glance at the peacekeeping operations budget will prove that this is once again a sunrise industry, going up from $1 billion in 1998 to more than $2 billion this year, we believe.

But the peacekeeping operations also suffered a near-death experience in recent time. After the disastrous experience in Somalia, many key Council members almost developed allergic reactions to new peacekeeping operations. In the your letter of 6 November 2000, you said:

> "There have been cases in which the Council decided to end a mission or to reduce significantly its military component, only to have those situations remain unstable, or worse, descend again into violence and chaos soon thereafter. This would seem to be in contradiction to the Council's mandate as contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that it should facilitate the establishment of a self-sustaining peace, or at least a durable absence of violence." (*S/2000/1072*)

There can be no better example to demonstrate the point in your letter than the case of Somalia — a classic example of a United Nations mission that entered and exited a situation without clear long-term goals. The experience of Somalia was also partly responsible for the tragic experience in Rwanda. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was downsized to a token force, which was helpless in the face of a preventable genocide there. If we are to be honest with ourselves, we should admit that the United Nations has still not exorcised the ghosts of Somalia and Rwanda from our deliberations. We hope that our debate today will be the first step in this direction. It may also be useful to complement our discussions here today by considering the topic "No entrance without strategy". Getting the strategy right before sending in a peacekeeping operation can also help to ensure that it terminates in success instead of failure. But we should also bear in mind that since perfect conditions for deploying a mission can never exist, the lack of such conditions should not be used as an excuse for staying out. What is important is that the strategy — not necessarily all the conditions — be right before the mission is deployed.

In discussing both successful and negative examples of mission closure and mission transition, Mr. President, you mention three examples in your annex: Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. We agree that these are three excellent case studies. Indeed, my delegation would like to offer its special congratulations to the Netherlands for adding another important dimension to the Security Council's work: reflecting in a lessons-learned mode on the successes and failures of Security Council decision-making regarding peacekeeping operations, as presented in the case studies. But it may also be helpful in this debate to cast our net wider and look at the full range of peacekeeping operations. We hope that one concrete outcome of today's debate will be that the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will produce brief case studies of all peacekeeping operations, as part of the revitalization process of the Lessons Learned Unit. These studies will provide the Council, the Secretariat and Member States with a valuable record of past mistakes, failures and successes in mission start-ups, transitions and closures. It is to be hoped that by recording all this in the United Nations institutional memory, some of the more egregious failures of United Nations peacekeeping will be avoided in the future. Let me also add here that the need to review lessons learned was a point we heard repeatedly this morning, including, I believe, in the remarks made by Sir Jeremy Greenstock and of course in the remarks just made by the Permanent Representative of Germany, Mr. Dieter Kastrup.

Our problem in analysing peacekeeping operations' successes and failures is that there is a huge variety of peacekeeping operation, even though they have only one name. In some ways, it is as useful to talk about peacekeeping operations in general as it is to talk about animals in general. Perhaps there is much in common between elephants and mice, snakes and

monkeys, cats and dogs. But there are also important differences. To understand how peacekeeping operations can be terminated successfully, perhaps for a start a clear distinction between the two normally propounded types is necessary.

The first type — created during the cold war in response to inter-State conflicts — provided the traditional definition of peacekeeping operations. The traditional peacekeeping operations were generally single-faceted operations. Their sole purpose was to monitor and supervise the lines of a ceasefire. The operations would exit only when the two sides arrived at a full peace agreement, unless they were compelled to withdraw earlier by one or both parties. They were peace monitors, not peacemakers or peace-builders. Yet they have provided valuable service, as demonstrated by their longevity. Many, of course, still exist: the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) after 51 years; the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) after 36 years; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) after 26 years; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after 22 years; and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) now after 9 years. To the best of our knowledge, no one is suggesting sunset clauses for these operations. This is a light burden which the international community seems ready to bear.

The second type of peacekeeping operations emerged as a result of the burst of euphoria that followed the end of the cold war. There was a genuine feeling, justified in many cases, that many of the old conflicts had been stoked by the cold war. Hence, in the immediate post-cold-war period many could be quickly resolved — and, I should add here, this was partly because the Security Council was also able to act in almost total unity. This paved the way for many early successes in the peacekeeping operations established to deal with internal situations, including in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Eastern Slavonia, Guatemala and the Central African Republic.

It would be foolish to try to draw general conclusions about why these peacekeeping operations succeeded. But one key common factor that we should take note of is that in all these cases, it appears that it was the local populations that took ownership of the peace process. As your annex notes, Mr. President, in Mozambique

> "the peace process enjoyed deep and patient support from various elements of civil society." *(S/2000/1072, annex, para. 11)*

It is also not possible to draw general conclusions about the grounds for peacekeeping-operation failures, such as in Haiti. As the same annex notes,

> "In light of the never-ending political stalemate in Haiti and the persistent related violence, one is likely to view the United Nations efforts in that country as a disappointment." (*ibid., para. 13*)

The annex goes on to state the reasons why. We are, I must confess here, intrigued by the concluding sentence, which states that

> "some key Council members pursued objectives in their own perceived national interests at the expense of making firmer commitments to resolve the Haitian conflict." (*ibid.*)

There was also, unfortunately, one major disastrous failure in the immediate post-cold-war era: Somalia, which has been referred to. We honestly do not know enough about Somalia to be able to explain the failure. Local factors played an important role. But key external actors also made major errors of judgement. The tragedy here is that the United Nations was held accountable for this failure when its hands were virtually tied throughout the operation. But the United Nations decision to walk away completely without leaving behind any kind of presence or involvement to help improve the situation will also remain a blot on the United Nations conscience. All those who plan mission termination and mission closure should have a section entitled "Remember the lessons of Somalia".

Somalia almost killed new peacekeeping operations. Fortunately, they survived as a species, and new ones in the second mode were born: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and, possibly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kosovo and East Timor further pushed the envelope of peacekeeping operations to handle transitional administrations. Mr. Hedi Annabi describes the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as follows:

> "UNTAET is a multidisciplinary operation, which combines the following elements: humanitarian relief, provision of security by a military force, administration of the territory and capacity-building for self-government, economic recovery

and development assistance. In other words, the United Nations is employing in East Timor, as it did in Kosovo, a comprehensive approach that combines elements of peacekeeping, enforcement, peace-building and development assistance."

Any discussion of mission closure and mission termination should look at these "live" case studies as much as it looks at past case studies. In which of these cases can we see a happy ending? And how do we avoid unhappy endings in the rest? Does each one have a unique strategy? Or are we, honestly, whistling in the dark and hoping for the best?

Of these live cases, East Timor probably remains the most hopeful. The reasons are complex. At the core of it all, there is a capable group of leaders led by Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta who are prepared to accept local responsibility for peace-building and nation-building. Sergio Vieira de Mello has also done a truly excellent job as the chief administrator. But — and this is an equally important point — East Timor can succeed only if the international community does not abandon it prematurely.

We see a fair degree of hope for the local leaders and population taking ownership of the peace process in East Timor. However, we are not sure who will take ownership of the peace process in Kosovo, and we would very much like to be enlightened on this major peacekeeping operation and its termination.

In conclusion, let me congratulate you once again, Mr. President, on raising a very important subject. It is not normal, as far as I can recall, to have a title with two negatives in it, as in "No exit without strategy". Letting the two negatives cancel each another out would give us a positive statement, which would read "Exit with strategy". We hope, therefore, that our deliberations will lead to more strategically considered rather than ill-considered exits as well as entrances in key and important peacekeeping operations.

**The President:** The next speaker on my list is the representative of Portugal. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Monteiro** (Portugal): First and foremost, I must praise you heartily for the initiative of the Netherlands in organizing this important meeting of the Security Council. The topic, "No exit without strategy", and the paper you prepared to guide our debate here today, go to the very heart of the action of the Security Council and the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and the maintenance of international peace and security. If the main problems in mission closure and mission termination, including the ones you have correctly identified, are resolved, then I believe we are on our way towards turning United Nations peace operations into an effective tool to help end violence and establish the bases for durable peace.

I recall our own efforts in this regard during our membership of the Security Council just a couple of years ago. It was under our own presidency of this organ in April 1997 that we tried — somewhat unsuccessfully, since some members were not yet ready to discuss these matters as freely as we are doing today — to get the Council to focus its attention on the so-called twilight zone, the period of transition between peacekeeping and peace-building that, because of inattention, could actually result in a return to violence in certain conflict situations. Then, as now, we believed that the Security Council should include in peacekeeping mandates the necessary elements that would permit an operation to withdraw smoothly and the next phase, the peace-building phase, to take over. I am referring to now well recognized activities, such as programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, as well as law and order components and other institutional strengthening. The role of United Nations civilian police in assisting the establishment of functioning and effective police forces in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, for example, is one such factor, which comes into play during the peacekeeping phase, but must continue beyond it, as in the case of Eastern Slavonia.

Since our time on the Council, this body has increasingly and rightly focused on these and other aspects crucial to the effectiveness of peacekeeping. This is an important process of establishing definitions, exploring concepts, identifying needs and proposing solutions, which in an organ such as the Security Council can ultimately be done only through its practice. And informed practice is the goal here.

Portugal fully agrees with the Netherlands that the Security Council, ably aided by the Secretariat, should have a strategy for exit, which is, of course, a strategy for the success of United Nations peace

efforts. The necessary resources should be combined with a clear and achievable mandate to help bring about the end of violence and irrevocably set the course of peace-building. Therefore, as you have pointed out, Mr. President, any long-term plan for peace operations must include a commitment to the post-conflict peace-building stage. We would go further and reiterate that since certain peace-building elements are part of peacekeeping they must be included in the initial planning and deployment of the operations.

Secondly, the Security Council should, as you have suggested, stay involved in all phases of the United Nations efforts to address a conflict situation. This is the best way to ensure a smooth transition from phase to phase, as well as to give a clear signal to all involved that the withdrawal of a peacekeeping component does not mean in any way that the United Nations is going back on its commitment to furthering peace-building and to resist a return to war.

All of these matters are an integral part of the decision-making process of the Security Council. To put it bluntly, this process is sometimes the "art of the possible" and not necessarily a rational response to crises, with optimal resources and clear objectives. Similarly, the Secretariat has tended to plan for addressing conflict situations according to the amount of troop contributions made available to it and not according to needs. It is hard to convince troop-contributing countries to provide more forces for peacekeeping operations when the United Nations, because of the continuing non-payment of dues and arrears, still owes them reimbursement for their participation in earlier or ongoing operations. It is a matter of principle, but also one of practical concern, that assessed contributions be paid in full, on time and without conditions; otherwise, this Organization cannot function. We are hopeful that this situation will be corrected in the near future, and we hope that troop contributors — such as Portugal, which, with over a thousand men and women in United Nations operations, is currently the eleventh largest United Nations troop contributor and first among its European Union partners — will continue to provide the lifeblood of United Nations peacekeeping, without which there can be no peace strategy, exit or otherwise.

Under such constraints, however, the Security Council has in the past failed to act or has authorized a mismatched operation in terms of resources or mandates or both. These factors also play a role in leading the Council prematurely to decide to withdraw from a conflict situation for political or economic reasons or because further involvement would require a new and strengthened strategy which, under the prevailing circumstances, would not be politically feasible. In such a world, the United Nations is successful only when the parties are committed to peace. If they are not, we are seriously challenged as an Organization and as an international community to come up with ways to stop the conflict.

It is more than evident that United Nations peacekeeping is sick, and that something must be done — and very soon — if the United Nations is to be effective as the primary actor in the maintenance of international peace and security. Thankfully, the Secretary-General convened the Panel on peace operations earlier this year, and the resulting report — the so-called Brahimi Panel report — provides a clear road map to correct peacekeeping. Many of the Panel's recommendations have indeed been made before — by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — and some of the resources and solutions already exist. But much more is required, and it is clear that the overwhelming majority of Member States believe the time is ripe to make hard but far-reaching and important decisions, once and for all, to establish United Nations peacekeeping on a solid foundation.

This foundation of United Nations peacekeeping is made up of three building blocks: the Member States, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

First, Member States must reaffirm their commitment to the United Nations as primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. They must afford it the necessary will and the resources to pursue peace activities. Furthermore, as countries contributing troops and other staff, they must be generous — a small investment in peace will always pay handsomely — and they must ensure that their men and women are well-trained and ready to deploy as quickly as possible.

Secondly, the Security Council, as the organ under the United Nations Charter with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, must be able fully to discharge its functions, with full knowledge and understanding of the conflict situations brought to its attention, for which it requires a clear supporting role from the

Secretariat. Furthermore, the Security Council must be responsive to Member States and, in each case, to the troop-contributing countries in question. Those who place their nation's sons and daughters in harm's way for the cause of peace must feel they have a voice in the decisions that affect them directly.

Finally, I come to the Secretariat, the fundamental structure required for the planning, deployment and management of peace operations. Without a well-resourced and well-staffed Secretariat, the United Nations cannot hope to be effective in peace operations. Before we can even begin to ask the Security Council to pay attention to the problems of transition between peacekeeping and peace-building, the Secretariat must be able to plan for such a capacity, including through the effective coordination of its relevant departments and with other actors within the United Nations system and beyond.

In conclusion, the issue you have raised for discussion today, Sir, is a crucial part of the decision-making process of the Security Council and one that is part and parcel of the current efforts to reform United Nations peacekeeping, following to a great extent the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. My delegation is particularly pleased to welcome the work of the Security Council in this regard, which culminated in the resolution adopted on Monday. Portugal urges the Council fully to implement its decisions and recommendations and to continue its work in this most important area.

Similarly, many troop-contributing countries — such as Germany, as Ambassador Kastrup has just announced — as recommended by the Brahimi Panel, are implementing their own measures in order better to respond to United Nations peacekeeping needs and the Secretary-General has announced those measures under his purview that are also being taken in response to the Brahimi Panel to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping.

It is now time for Member States to act to complete this collective effort. They must make known their concerns and their support for the reform of United Nations peacekeeping. The commitment to this vital role of the United Nations must be translated into real decisions that will permit this Organization to become an effective actor in helping to bring peace to where there once was war and in keeping it that way.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Kumalo** (South Africa): It is good to see you presiding over this meeting today, Sir. My delegation would like to congratulate you for your courage in selecting such an important topic for us to discuss. I must say, before I get to my remarks, that I truly regret that some of your colleagues, when it came to the time for us to join in this dialogue on this important issue, were unable to be here. We do realize that there are many meetings going on around the United Nations, but we still hold the hope that this Chamber will become a true dialogue Chamber where we can also come, contribute the little that we contribute and be heard in the spirit of dialogue that we hope this Chamber will continue to have.

Again, thank you for tackling this very, very important theme. Above all, thank you for the thought-provoking paper your delegation sent to us to serve as a basis for discussion for today's debate. We thought it was also innovative that you had the courage to put your ideas on paper and to provoke us in a creative way, finding ways to deal with this matter.

In our view, the theme of the debate is important because it suggests a critical issue with which States Members of the United Nations have been grappling for the last decade. It is true that this body has been faced with fundamental changes in the nature of conflicts, which has necessitated a shift in the Council and the broader United Nations approach to the task of maintaining international peace and security. The whole question of whether the United Nations is able to attract troop contributions for peacekeeping from certain countries may have something to do with the theme of today's discussion.

As a result, we have come to witness that the United Nations primary instrument for maintaining peace and security — peacekeeping — has come to take on a broader and more complex range of tasks instead of the traditional military interposing between warring factions. In his seminal report of 1992, which was called "An Agenda for Peace", former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali captured this change, arguing that:

> "Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include

> comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to ... advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people." (*S/24111, para. 55*)

In our view, what this point suggests is that the energies and resources of the international community should be mobilized and organized to address not only the symptoms of crises and conflicts, but their root causes, including the political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions. It further requires that efforts to resolve conflicts should be viewed as long-term endeavours which include a significant investment in peace-building.

The discussion paper before us poses an important question regarding the scope and nature of Security Council mandates in responding to complex conflicts. South Africa's own policy paper guiding its participation in international peace missions argues that Security Council mandates should be linked to concrete political solutions and that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation should not be seen as an end in itself. In other words, we need a clear commitment to the prevention of conflicts before they degenerate into full-fledged civil wars. This is important, as, like that of many countries, our participation in peace missions should not and cannot be open-ended. We would make bold to say that a credible exit strategy is inextricably linked to any well-planned project to build sustainable and durable peace.

In addressing the questions raised in your discussion paper, Sir, my delegation would like to put forward the following points.

First, my delegation has strongly welcomed the recent debate of the Security Council on the issue of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as an important element of post-conflict peace-building. However, this aspect is but one of several elements of a more comprehensive concept of peace-building that require our urgent attention. The Brahimi report recommendations on the need to develop a permanent capacity in the United Nations for peace-building requires the urgent attention of Member States.

Secondly, the comprehensive scope and long-term nature of peace-building activities impose the need to consider the limits of the involvement of the Security Council in such activities. The implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel on this matter must also address the involvement of other components of the United Nations system, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other United Nations programmes and agencies.

Thirdly, related to all this are the responsibilities attached to peace-building activities in today's complex conflict environments. In our view, these tasks transcend the abilities and resource capacities of any one particular department or agency within the United Nations system. Consequently, the Organization is obliged to undertake its efforts in a coordinated manner.

For that reason, we welcome the intention of the Secretary-General to institute integrated mission task forces to plan, at an early stage, for peace operations which will facilitate the smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building.

In conclusion, my delegation would like congratulate the Security Council on having adopted its resolution 1327 (2000), mapping out its response to the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. The time has now arrived to follow words with action. In that regard, the important issue of political will and commitment becomes critical. We raise this issue because there has been tremendous criticism, and rightly so, about the commitment gap on the part of those with the greatest means when dealing with conflicts in Africa. The resolution which the Council adopted on the Brahimi Panel report must now be followed up by concrete action to invest in sustainable and durable peace in the many conflict situations in Africa, the most urgent of which is Sierra Leone.

Now is the time to engage in the pursuit of national interest defined in terms of promoting global solidarity and not in terms of what is vital to our immediate needs. Otherwise our efforts to promote and sustain an effective and strong Organization will be rendered useless. This, in short, requires a commitment to become and remain involved in the field, and, side by side with developing countries, to resolve conflicts and establish lasting peace.

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Rwanda, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance

with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mutaboba (Rwanda) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.*

**The President:** The next speaker is the representative of Thailand. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Jayanama** (Thailand): I thank the Security Council for this opportunity to express our views on an issue of great importance both to the Security Council and to all of us in the United Nations. Our appreciation also goes to you personally, Mr. President, and to the Netherlands for preparing the thought-provoking paper (S/2000/1072, annex) on the theme "no exit without strategy", which forms the basis of today's debate. The fact that the Security Council has already, two days ago, adopted a resolution on the report (S/2000/809) of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi does not mean that the question of a clear and achievable mandate for United Nations peacekeeping has been resolved. Today's debate will further clarify this ongoing issue, and will meet one of the important objectives of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, namely the improvement of the working methods of the Security Council.

We find the paper refreshing, stimulating and, for those of us who cannot always follow the work of the Security Council on a regular basis, even revealing. The paper advocates that exit strategies be linked to peacekeeping-mission objectives, and that, once realistic mission objectives are agreed upon, resources be made available and follow-up activities take place. We agree with that consistent position. The paper also raises questions which made clear that this proposition has not always been handled in an effective way. At the same time, the paper recognizes that, in some cases, the prolonged presence of peacekeeping may not be beneficial. The paper thus expresses the belief that the United Nations does not have to be engaged every time and everywhere.

We particularly agree that frank and honest debates produce realistic objectives for peacekeeping missions. We should like to add that to produce good exit strategies, in addition to debates of that character, all parties concerned, including troop-contributing countries, should be consulted.

But we are sceptical about the paper's advocacy of an exit strategy based on the successful fulfilment of a mission mandate as signified by the achievement of a lasting peace.

Nevertheless, we admire the paper's theoretical consistency and target-oriented perspective. Like that of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" (S/24111) of 1992, this perspective is somewhat idealistic and therefore difficult to completely implement successfully due to very practical reasons such as lack of human and financial resources and of an appropriate political environment. After all, sustainable peace can be achieved only by the national conflicting parties themselves. Peacekeeping can help, but it is not a panacea that will cure more deep-seated national conflicts.

In view of the overstretched resources for peacekeeping and of political constraints, maybe it is time to ask ourselves whether it is necessary for the United Nations to intervene in every conflict situation. By advocating more frankness, honesty, transparency and objectivity in making peacekeeping decisions, the paper implicitly asks that type of question. We think that some situations may indeed be ripe for United Nations action, while in others, regional organizations could play their part under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The United Nations can also propose or approve coalitions of the willing or other practical options.

Of course, it is better still not to have conflict — or, realistically, to have as little conflict as possible. And here we support strongly the Secretary-General's initiative to replace the prevailing culture of reaction with a culture of prevention, which we believe is a highly preferable and more effective means to address the possible outbreak of conflict. Prevention is better than cure, as the old saying goes. Therefore, the United Nations should do more work on preventive diplomacy, which, after all, is one of the many components of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace".

**The President:** The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement.

**Ms. Wensley** (Australia): Mr. President, Australia welcomes your initiative in holding this open debate on a topic which is of particular relevance to the way that the Security Council sets mandates for United Nations operations. This should be a debate about considerably more than the terms on which the Council decides to conclude an operation. What my Government wishes to see from the Council is a more consistent approach to planning operations in the first place, one in which planning for the end of an operation is an integral and indispensable aspect of all Council decisions to authorize deployment of peacekeepers and other United Nations personnel.

Australia strongly agrees there should be no exit without strategy, but also wants to stress that this is not in itself sufficient. The Council quite simply should not create operations without an exit strategy. Moreover, any subsequent adjustment to the planning of a operation's end date should be timely and transparent, and should, as so many others have said, be the subject of prior consultations with nations contributing troops to that operation.

Developing an exit strategy requires a clear view of the objectives of the operation. It seems to us that if the aim, or aims, are clear to Council members, then the conditions that need to be in place before the Council declares the mission has been achieved can be readily identified. Similarly, the operational concepts — what actions are necessary to achieve those conditions — can be developed more readily.

There is often a debate about the validity of setting a specific date for the end of a United Nations operation, or tying it to the achievement of a certain event or outcome, such as a referendum or an election. On the one hand, creating the conditions for such an event to take place is in some cases the very rationale of a United Nations operation. On the other hand, experience has shown — for example, with the Angolan election in 1992 — that simply setting the date of an election or of the transfer of authority to a legitimate Government as the trigger for the United Nations departure can be too simple a formula if it is taken without considering the broader political and social context. The fact is that once the United Nations has developed a significant role on the ground, its own credibility is in part affected by the terms on which an operation leaves, and the impact that that has on peace and stability in the country concerned. So there is no golden rule for the Council on how it specifies an end-point for an operation, other than the importance that the conditions for ending the operation be anticipated in the original planning, and that the Council avoid open-ended commitments for United Nations operations.

In our view, exit strategies should take into account not only the military end-state that the Council wants to see achieved, but also the political and economic implications of a pull-out or of a significant reduction in the numbers of peacekeepers or other United Nations personnel. Politically, that might include such factors as the sustainability of political processes once the United Nations presence has gone, and also whether processes of reconciliation between parties in conflict, or the re-establishment of the conditions for an election or other significant national event, are in place. It is only reasonable here that the Council not be expected to set the bar too high; there will rarely be a situation when the United Nations leaves with a completely stable, fully functioning polity achieved. Rather, the benchmark should be that political processes are such that there is no longer a threat to international peace and security.

Economically, the impact of the United Nations exit can be negative or positive. In the short term, the United Nations withdrawal can often mean the loss of a significant source of demand and of income, but, equally, we need to be mindful that a large-scale United Nations presence can create distortions in a local economy, especially if left in place for a long time. In those cases where the United Nations has a major impact on a national economy — for example, because of the size of an operation or because, as in East Timor and Kosovo, it has actually established a transitional administration — those economic factors need to be given weight by the Council. There should be, to the maximum extent possible, a seamless transition from high levels of United Nations-stimulated economic activity and short-term project assistance to medium-term projects that will work to support the economy for the longer haul.

This will obviously entail the coordination of planning and the implementation of medium-term development assistance projects so that the termination of the formal operation does not result in frustration or, worse, in a renewal of tensions or a sense that the United Nations has suddenly turned its back on the country being assisted. In our view, the Council will necessarily look to the Secretary-General and to other

United Nations organs and agencies, as well as to the international community more broadly, to be the agents for planning and implementing this assistance. Again, we do not think there is any one formula to guide the Council; rather, our point is that all of these factors should be integral to exit strategies.

I suppose that many of the points that I am putting forward can be summarized as an appeal to the Council, often working more closely with other principal organs of the United Nations, to address a strategy of assistance to the country in which the United Nations has mandated an operation for the period after the Blue Helmets have gone. It is of course desirable that "exit" equate successful achievement of the goals set by the Council. But we recognize that this will not always be possible. Sometimes, the Council will have to withdraw an operation because it has not succeeded in its mandated role. In such cases, however, we would argue strongly that the withdrawal of the operation should not be the end of the matter. In such cases, the Council would need to develop new goals or a strategy for reaching the desired end-state by other means.

In the spirit of greater transparency and effectiveness in the Council's work, the Council should put a premium on developing exit strategies in consultation with countries most directly affected by its decisions. One obvious group of countries is those contributing troops and police to an operation, particularly where specific timelines are incorporated for planning purposes. There is also, however, an onus on individual contributing countries to give early advice to the United Nations about their own plans for length of deployment. The reality is that some of them will be unable to maintain a presence throughout the life of an operation, and this should also be factored into mission planning.

One of the ways of improving the quality of the Council's decisions — and this is surely what we are all talking about — is to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to assist with planning, including by enhancing the professional military advice available at United Nations Headquarters. From Australia's viewpoint, this is one of the most critical elements identified in the Brahimi report, and one which we have strongly supported in discussions in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Australia has consistently sought greater rigour in the Council's decisions to create new mandates. We certainly hope that today's debate will influence the way the in which the Council conducts its business. We appreciate that speed and the pressure of many competing demands are always constraints on how much the Council can do. And yet the United Nations and Member States' resources are limited, and we should be prepared to make the additional effort to ensure that United Nations operations are as well planned as possible and that the Council does not create operations without an exit strategy.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Aboulgheit** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of November. I wish to express my gratitude to your delegation for its initiative, despite the time constraints involved, to prepare this discussion today on the theme "No exit without strategy". This is indeed an important subject that necessitates in-depth study and special attention from the Organization and its principal organs.

However, I would like to say candidly that I am in full agreement with the introductory statement made by Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa. I, too, wanted many of our colleagues who are heads of the delegations and of countries that are members of the Council to listen to us during this meeting.

The delegation of Egypt concurs with the summary in the President's document that an exit strategy for a peacekeeping operation requires clear-cut vision, specific, predetermined phases and consideration of the political, military and security conditions prevailing in the host country or region. In this regard, the delegation of Egypt would like to contribute the following points to this debate.

First, in dealing with the termination stage of an operation, the Council should do so using a case-by-case approach. It is not conceivable or practical for us to apply one single policy or a number of strict policies to all cases that the Council deals with without paying attention to the particular characteristics of each case.

Secondly, while we recognize that there is a certain amount of politicization in the work of the

Council and in the relations that certain members of the Council, particularly the permanent members, have with certain conflict areas for which peacekeeping operations are instituted, the Council should not in our opinion resort to exerting political pressure on any side by hinting at terminating an operation, reducing an operation or resorting to any method of political pressure that would serve the political interests of one or more States in the Council without paying attention to the interests of the host State or region in which the operation takes place, not to mention the interests of the members of the society hosting the operation.

Thirdly, in this context, I feel duty-bound to refer to the examples of Somalia and Rwanda. These are cases that were not dealt with in the document distributed by the presidency. These examples unfortunately indicate that the Council had in mind certain political considerations for ending an operation that were different from, and perhaps even contradictory to, the interests of the State hosting the operation. Such considerations have led to huge losses in human life and to cases of regional instability that have continued to the present.

This is what comes to mind when we say that the Security Council should shoulder its responsibilities — the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter and the role established for it within the framework of the system of collective security, which makes it necessary for its members to put aside any narrow, individual or political considerations in favour of the higher and more general interests by supporting the collective security system and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fourthly, the Security Council, should consider the mistakes made in the past — whether by abandoning an operation before it was time to do so or by terminating an operation that ran counter to the political and social environment — and should learn from them. In this respect, we call upon the Council to establish a more direct and frank dialogue with other organs, first and foremost among which is the General Assembly which, through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, deals with the subject and its machinery and with the best methods of implementation.

Fifthly, the time factor is of prime importance in matters before the Security Council, but the time factor should not be a decisive element in determining the strategy of the United Nations for exiting from an operation or from a host State. In saying this, we have in mind United Nations peacekeeping operations that have existed for decades, but their presence in the areas concerned has become a factor that has helped to reduce fears and has become an important symbol of international presence until such time as the root causes of a problem are dealt with and settled in a manner acceptable to all parties.

Sixthly, the Council, while embarking on setting up a strategy to exit from an operation or from a State, should take into consideration that mandates are not open-ended and unlimited and that an operation should stop when the matter becomes one of peace-building, which is dealt with in the Council and other organs or the United Nations — first and foremost, the General Assembly. The Security Council should consult with the General Assembly and with other major organs and agencies on the best way to carry out the next phase.

In conclusion, setting up strategies to exit from peacekeeping operations is a matter that requires a number of elements, first among which is the political will of the members of the Council. Also required is coordination and consultation between the Council and other principal organs and, on occasion, between the Council and other relevant regional organizations in order to agree on the best way to exit from an operation in an appropriate, positive and beneficial way for the host State or region.

**The President**: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Italy. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Vento** (Italy): Let me begin by paying homage to the Dutch presidency of the Security Council for organizing today's open debate. This brainstorming session is an important complement to the Security Council's July debate on conflict prevention. It is very timely indeed and forces us to look beyond contingent factors in our reflections on peace-building strategies. Peacekeeping without peace-building is a headless torso. What we need, and urgently, is a comprehensive strategy covering conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building. Such a strategy requires the coordinated efforts of all the actors in the United Nations system, especially in preparing exit strategies for peacekeeping missions.

There can be no exit strategy unless a comprehensive strategy is already in place at the start

of a peace operation. Too often an exit strategy has amounted to little more than a quick escape route. We need a clear political vision to prevent the recurrence of another situation, such as the unravelling of the mission to Sierra Leone. We need to move beyond a logic that is dictated by emergencies or by partial, temporary interests. Instead, we need to build a functional connection between the conflict prevention phase and the possible action to be undertaken if a crisis degenerates into a threat to international peace and security. Such a strategy must also include provisions for peace-building, a stage that is essential to achieving sustainable peace once an operation has ended. Let us not forget that well-planned peace building can also have a preventive effect by stemming any potential relapses.

Peace-building in the context of an integrated strategy has two key dimensions: consolidating the judicial and public-order systems, and the reconstruction efforts that also seek to eliminate the economic and social problems at the roots of conflicts. These two aspects are complementary: they require both a holistic approach and specific concrete actions.

A number of recommendations in the Brahimi report, such as the development of a standing rapid deployment capacity and the emphasis on the use of civilian police, dovetail with thinking currently under way in the European Union. The United Nations and the European Union have much to learn from each other in the fields of crisis management and conflict prevention. These same issues were high on the Secretary-General's agenda in discussions with European Union leaders during his trip to Europe last October. And it is around such issues that United Nation-European Union relations can further develop.

The rule of law is fundamental to the success of any comprehensive peace strategy, particularly in the phase encompassing the withdrawal of complex United Nations missions.

Alongside the affirmation of the principle of the rule of law, I would underline Italy's longstanding commitment to the advancement of international justice, the chief guarantor of the rights of the weakest. We need higher standards of international legality. Far from representing a threat, this trend creates a safety net against double standards. The time has come to put an end to the law of the strongest and to affirm a form of justice that will gradually foster outgrowing the need for an international presence in crisis areas.

We cannot exempt ourselves from concrete action. Prompt ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is the best way for Member States to meet this need. International justice has both a preventive and a constructive function. It fosters reconciliation through the search for truth. Let us not forget that at the basis of the concept of justice lie the principles of impartiality, generality and abstraction. They guarantee that Member States' demands will be met and that there will be an effective transition from the emergency phase of a crisis to its resolution and the successful exit of the international presence.

In this light, let me draw your attention to the criminal justice system, a series of measures involving police forces, investigating magistrates, judges and incarceration. The Brahimi report makes a useful proposal to establish a system of transitional norms governing criminal law procedures in order to facilitate the work of those engaged in police and civil justice administration as part of complex peace missions. We have already experienced this need in Kosovo and East Timor.

In terms of policing duties, within the European Union Italy has been involved in efforts to develop greater consistency and coherence of action. In December 1999 the European Council, meeting in Helsinki, set the goal of creating, by 2003, a rapid reaction force of 60,000 soldiers for deployment to peacekeeping operations, including those launched by the United Nations. Last June in Feira the complementary goal was set to establish, by 2003, a rapid response team of 5,000 police officers ready for deployment as part of peacekeeping operations. This development will foster more intense collaboration between the European Union and the United Nations.

Attention to economic and social aspects is an indispensable corollary to an international presence in crisis areas. This is even truer when we consider the close connection in developing countries between deeply rooted economic and social problems and the outbreak of conflicts. The Secretary-General's seminal report on the causes of conflicts in Africa underlines this critical nexus. We need to assure greater continuity between political and military action and the economic and social reconstruction, without which there can be

no peaceful international pull out. Better synergy between the Secretariat and the relevant United Nations programmes and funds is essential to this goal.

Let us also focus on elections as a crucial moment in complex peace operations. Exiting from an operation without first holding elections can be a recipe for failure. Here too the Brahimi report indicates concrete steps, such as strengthening the Department of Political Affairs Electoral Assistance Division. Another need frequently cited in the debate on peacekeeping operations is training. Addressing the Security Council, the Secretary-General has underlined the importance of courses on early warning and conflict prevention given for some years now by the United Nations Staff College at Turin. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are holding a course at the Staff College on peace-building and human rights for military and police personnel, with special attention to gender balance.

Integrated strategies also entail the rejection of arbitrary sunset clauses. In fact, the United Nations must assure that conflicts have been settled before dismantling a peacekeeping operation. We must pay close attention to the definition of clear, credible and achievable mandates. Such a goal can never be reached without Member States who are willing to contribute personnel. This is why Italy is pleased that the Security Council adopted two days ago a series of decisions pursuant to the Brahimi report and the Secretary-General's action plan. These measures include a more regular and systematic involvement of troop-contributing countries in the Security Council's activities in every phase of a peacekeeping operation, from defining the mandate to implementing the relevant Security Council resolution, to changing a mandate owing to a mutating situation on the ground.

Italy's heavy involvement in three very different peacekeeping operations has taught us some important lessons. In Somalia, the lack of a clear strategy and of a well-defined mandate led to the exit of the international presence. We are still suffering the consequences today. Troop-contributors were kept on the sidelines of the Security Council's and the Secretariat's decision-making, starting with the definition of the original mandate. When the crisis degenerated, the error was compounded with an even more ambiguous mandate, while ignoring the opinions of troop contributors.

We also learned from another experience, this time positive, in Albania in 1997. Here the Security Council quickly authorized a resolution proposed by both Albania and Italy — both non-members of the Council — to prevent the deterioration of a political crisis that would have seriously threatened peace and security. A core group of countries was formed of participating countries. This guaranteed effective management of the crisis and ongoing contacts with the Security Council, as well as with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna, which successfully monitored democratic and fair elections in the country.

Your introduction to today's debate, Mr. President, mentions another United Nations success story: the mission in Mozambique. The peacekeeping operation there was preceded by an accurate assessment of the local political context, with the active contribution of an Italian non-governmental organization. This facilitated the maintenance of peace and the subsequent withdrawal of the international presence, accompanied by elections and ongoing social and economic reconstruction. That positive situation kept the constructive attention of the international community focused on Mozambique, as was demonstrated by the response to the natural disasters that struck that country last May.

In a similar manner, the fact that the mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea was prepared for with, and accompanied by, intense political and diplomatic efforts on the part of the Organization of African Unity and the facilitators, allowed us to place greater trust in the outcome of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea from the outset. We have much to learn from the example of Mozambique in designing future peacekeeping missions and exit strategies that are able successfully to meet the situation on the ground and interface actively and rationally with the various national and international players involved.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Norway. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Hønningstad** (Norway): In our common determination to uphold international peace and security, we must do our utmost to ensure the success of United Nations peace operations. Norway welcomes the initiative of the Dutch presidency of the Security Council to debate operational mandates and exit

strategies, which we believe is a timely and useful contribution to attaining this goal.

The exit of a United Nations peace operation should follow the successful restoration of peace and security in the country or region in question. When the United Nations decides to intervene in a complex conflict, the goal must be to move from the situation that led to the eruption of conflict to a situation in which a new and self-sustained situation of peace and security has taken root.

This means that the operation must support the development of a society and political structure that can address both the fundamental causes of the conflict and the resolution of conflicts of interest through a legitimate and participatory system. Due consideration should therefore be given to the role of natural resources as a cause of armed conflict and a means of waging it.

In our view, we need to distinguish between "end-date"- and "end-state"-oriented exit strategies. It is our belief that an exit strategy for the military component of a mission based on an end date and disconnected from the overall objectives of the peace operation, reduces the chances of success. Planning for military withdrawal must therefore be coordinated with a gradual transfer of responsibilities from the international mission to local authorities, as this is essential in order to normalize the situation in a post-conflict area.

A well-defined exit strategy is also important in obtaining support for the mission among the people and their representatives. In order to reduce the possibility of the unilateral withdrawal of forces, or the pressure for an "end date"-oriented exit strategy, the troop-contributing countries must be trusted and supported in their efforts to fulfil the mission's mandate. We believe realistic mandates containing a well-defined goal for the mission and a carefully established plan for how to reach that "end state" will contribute to this.

A key word in devising exit strategies is "planning". The Brahimi report contains several important recommendations for strengthening and improving the planning capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. We should put great effort into implementing these recommendations in order to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to make long-term overall strategies for the successful conduct of future multifunctional peace operations.

To sum up our views, certain principles should be followed in pursuing successful peace operations and, by implication, the successful exit of such missions.

First, United Nations peace operations should be given clear goals and mandates. The Security Council must engage in debates and negotiations that are realistic and frank with regard to the nature of the situation under consideration and to the desired outcome.

Secondly, the mandate should fit the task. The United Nations needs to address the root causes of the conflict in question. In many cases, these are interconnected in a web of economic, social, historical and ethnic factors. The complexity of the causes of conflict requires a broad concept of peace and security in order to understand them and a broad response in order to address them. Furthermore, complex peace operations require a high level of coordination within the United Nations system.

Thirdly, the resources must fit the mandate. The Security Council should not initiate operations without being adequately prepared. Adopted mandates must have the backing of forces sufficient in numbers and material to be carried out effectively. In this regard, we welcome the Brahimi Panel's recommendations aimed at closing the gap between mandates and resources. In our view, due consideration should be given to ways of involving potential troop-contributing countries more closely in the work of the Security Council with regard to mandating peace operations. This would help close the gap between mandates and resources, while still enabling the United Nations to deploy peace operations in a timely manner.

Fourthly, there is a need for a long-term perspective on peace and security. The involvement of the United Nations should be seamless, from preventive measures through peace operations to post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. An overall long-term strategy designed to lead to a self-sustaining peace in the conflict area where a United Nations operation is launched is therefore required. We also believe that the Council must remain engaged throughout all phases of a peace operation.

Norway will actively work towards the implementation of these principles when we take our seat in the Security Council on 1 January next year.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Denmark. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Bøjer** (Denmark): I should like first to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your very timely and important discussion paper prepared for today's meeting of the Council. The paper addresses a momentous and indeed crucial issue. How do we move successfully from one phase of a peace operation, which is peacekeeping, to the next, which is post-conflict peace-building, thereby ensuring a long-term perspective?

Taking as my point of departure the discussion paper, I shall, first, discuss the criteria for successfully bridging peacekeeping and the consolidation of peace, and, secondly, comment more specifically on the decision-making of the Security Council with regard to mission closure or mission transition.

Denmark has increasingly placed its efforts for the prevention of violent conflict in the context of our comprehensive engagement in development cooperation and assistance. As the Secretary-General stated so eloquently in his millennium report:

> "every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth ... is a step towards conflict prevention." (*A/54/2000, para. 202*)

Several of our development cooperation programmes and activities include specific measures for conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. We address conflicts between countries as well as within countries. But, unfortunately, prevention often fails, conflict erupts, and a need for peacekeeping and peace-building presents itself. Denmark has been strongly and actively engaged in United Nations peacekeeping since 1948. Today, we remain among the largest per capita providers of peacekeepers to United Nations-mandated and United Nations-operated missions.

In her important report to the Council last week, the outgoing High Commissioner for Refugees spoke of the need to look at different options — not only fully-fledged peacekeeping, but also, and especially, measures intended to support local law-enforcement capacity — working together, as opposed to straightforward intervention. If we apply this concept, which could perhaps be called a concept of subsidiarity, at the start of an operation, then we might induce local parties to maintain a greater part of responsibility themselves. That, in turn, might improve the chances of returning to a situation where the intensity of the operation could again be reduced.

Any exit strategy should be based on the notion of "local ownership" of the peace-building process; responsibilities should be gradually handed over to local authorities. Building local capacities should therefore be an integral part of any exit strategy.

Peace operations, as we all know, are no longer merely a question of keeping warring parties apart or of monitoring ceasefires. Today's operations are comprehensive and complex undertakings that may involve the disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of combatants, the supervision of elections, the monitoring of human rights, the training of local police forces, and so on. The nexus between peacekeeping and peace-building is often crucial, and the achievement of a self-supporting post-conflict situation will very much depend on the groundwork laid out during the peacekeeping mission. The process of moving from peacekeeping to the consolidation of peace should be seen as a continuum, one that reaches from pre-conflict preventive action, through the conflict and peace operation phase, into the post-conflict peace-building stage — that is, from peace to peace.

We agree that an exit strategy should not refer only to the withdrawal of the military component of a United Nations operation, but rather to what the discussion paper describes as

> "a long-term plan designed to lead to a self-sustaining peace in the conflict area" *(S/2000/1072, annex, para. 3)*.

But what should such a long-term plan take into account? I should like to outline a number of elements that Denmark considers to be essential in order to build a solid bridge between peacekeeping and the long-term consolidation of peace.

The withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from a former conflict area should take place in a gradual manner, as the situation becomes sufficiently stable. The phasing out of a military presence will very often be followed by an enhanced civilian presence, with a

view to accelerating the post-conflict peace-building process.

In this regard, Denmark fully supports the recommendations of the Brahimi report on United Nations peace operations, and we welcome the proposed shift towards the use of civilian police to promote and safeguard the rule of law. Police, and also judicial experts, are indispensable in order to rebuild civil society and the economy, and their work must be part of a solid peace-building strategy. Allow me to draw attention to the European Union's initiative to make a police force of 5,000 officers available to the international community by 2003, a commitment spurred by the foreign ministers of Denmark and the Netherlands.

Another very important point is coordination with the humanitarian and developmental agencies that are already operating in the area. The leadership of a peacekeeping mission should work closely with these agencies. At the Headquarters level, the establishment, as proposed, of integrated mission task forces could prove to be an essential tool in bringing developmental and humanitarian expertise into the planning and execution of missions.

Landmines are a serious obstacle to post-conflict development, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) should play an important and integrated role in the planning of missions, where relevant.

Another important task for missions to areas where armed conflict has taken place is to ensure that the small arms and light weapons used by the warring parties are collected and destroyed.

Let me now conclude by returning to the essence of our discussion today: what should the Security Council do when preparing a decision on mission closure or mission transition in order to ensure a long-term perspective? One way of ensuring coherence between peacekeeping, peace consolidation and reconstruction efforts could be for the Council to strengthen consultations with the Secretariat as well as with the humanitarian and developmental agencies of the United Nations family when formulating closure mandates. Furthermore, a mandate must not inappropriately limit the Secretary-General's ability to shape and adjust the operation or mission to take account of evolving circumstances.

To sum up, conflict prevention is essential, and poverty reduction and economic growth — together with respect for, and the achievement of, human rights — are irreplaceable elements of conflict prevention. When prevention fails, rapid but measured and targeted action is called for. After an intervention involving armed force, the tools that might have prevented the conflict will still be needed, although they might have to be supplemented by others, and the task will be more difficult.

Just as speed is essential at the start of a peace operation, it is of no less importance at the end in order to avoid a gap between the peacekeeping operation — with its accompanying emergency, short-term humanitarian activities — and long-term reconstruction and development programmes.

Peacekeepers and peace-builders are inseparable partners. There is rarely an exit for peacekeepers without the peace-builders' work. We urge the Security Council to continue to recognize, and elaborate on, this multidimensional and holistic approach to conflict solution in playing its role as the primary guardian of international peace and security.

**The President:** The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Philippines. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Mabilangan** (Philippines): Implicit in the topic of today's debate is the admission that the balance sheet of the Security Council on peacekeeping is, at best, spotty. This is made evident in the paper prepared by the Netherlands for today's open debate. Let me congratulate you, Mr. President, for taking this initiative and for raising this important matter at this time.

Of course, while there have been success stories in peacekeeping, there have been failures and shortcomings as well.

We appreciate the need for a strategy and a clear set of criteria on when United Nations peacekeeping operations should exit or be withdrawn from a mission area. We welcome the remarkable candidness of the Dutch paper and the comments made today by some Council members on the lack of discussion in the Council on exit strategies.

An exit strategy should be an essential component of any mandate on peacekeeping. The mandate should be clear and definitive on what the United Nations

would try to accomplish in a particular mission. Without an objective, any peacekeeping mission would be a waste of personnel and financial resources.

We are of the view that the lack of a clear exit strategy in many, if not most, of the United Nations peacekeeping missions is symptomatic of a deeper problem that everyone recognizes.

A culture of accommodation among the five permanent members after the end of the cold war brought about the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping missions. These missions became known as "second generation" peacekeeping operations because of the expanded scope of such missions in comparison with "traditional" peacekeeping. Paradoxically, the cooperation by the five permanent of the Security Council brought about a sort of cozy elitism that became a subject of concern for non-members, who felt excluded from the process of formulating mandates for peacekeeping missions.

The opaque method of consultations in the Security Council on peacekeeping has contributed to the difficulty that this open debate is trying to untangle today. Any credible peacekeeping mission would require a well-conceived mandate with a clear exit strategy, a well-supported operation, a well-conducted execution of plans and, as the underpinning of the whole mission, a well-coordinated effort by the international community. The Security Council could not bypass the input from the United Nations membership, other organs of the United Nations system and other international bodies and agencies if the Council were responding not just to the narrow national interests of some of its members but to the broad aspirations of the international community for peace and security.

We see the transparency of the Security Council on peacekeeping as requiring two dimensions. These dimensions represent the partnerships that the Council should foster and strengthen if it is to fulfil its mandate enshrined in the Charter.

The first and foremost of these partnerships would be with troop-contributing countries. The Security Council must engage in dialogue the countries that would place the lives of their people on the line in peacekeeping missions. Such dialogue would foster trust among the key players in peacekeeping. Without this trust, the United Nations ability and resolve to confront conflict situations would have little international support. Furthermore, the objectives and exit strategy devised by the Council, without the input of troop contributors, would lack legitimacy. Troop contributors should feel involved in the decision-making process on missions in which they participate. Indeed, there has been improvement in the area of consultations between the Council and troop-contributing countries. The Philippines particularly welcomes the adoption by the Council of resolution 1327 (2000) two days ago. But much remains to be done.

The second dimension of the international partnership for peacekeeping should be particularly relevant because of the onset of the "second generation" peacekeeping operations. In United Nations parlance, these missions have also been referred to as "complex" or "multidimensional" peacekeeping operations. Some refer to these operations as peace-building activities and lament the fact that these activities demonstrate a "mission creep" on some Council-mandated peace operations. We do not see this as mission creep per se, but this seems to be an area that would require the cooperative efforts of the Council and the relevant agencies in the United Nations system, as well as other international bodies, including the Bretton Woods institutions.

On its own, the Security Council cannot ensure that United Nations involvement in resolving a particular conflict would result in sustainable peace and development. It has no capability to devise a comprehensive peace and development strategy. To be successful at bridging the difficult transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development, the root causes of conflict should be addressed with political, social and developmental instruments. There is therefore a need for a closer partnership between the Council and other relevant international bodies and agencies to achieve a comprehensive solution to conflict situations.

The challenges to peacekeeping are daunting. Meeting these challenges would require the full participation and cooperation of the international community at every stage of the mission — from formulating mandates to devising exit strategies for peacekeeping operations. International partnership would harness international cooperation to achieve sustainable peace and development for the communities and peoples that need help.

**The President**: The next speaker is the representative of Finland. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement.

**Ms. Rasi** (Finland): At the outset, let me express, on behalf of the Finnish delegation, our congratulations to you, Mr. President, on assuming the trailblazing role in putting forward the subject of Security Council decision-making on mission closure and mission transition, which is of paramount importance and currency. We hope that the conclusions initiated by this discussion, together with lessons learned from past experiences, can be transformed into profit to be utilized in future United Nations peacekeeping activities.

As a Member State actively engaged in peacekeeping, Finland welcomes this opportunity to elaborate on a concept that constitutes an essential element of comprehensive United Nations peacekeeping. Moreover, we consider this discussion topical in the context of the current peacekeeping debate triggered by the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. In our view, this exchange of views is an important step towards an integrated examination of various aspects of peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building. In our view, these form a continuum where the Security Council must remain engaged throughout all phases and where transition from one phase to another should be carefully planned and implemented, with the involvement of the whole United Nations family.

When thinking about the structure of peacekeeping operations, the exit part of the operation could be regarded as the final stage of the comprehensive continuum, which is based on a clear mandate. The old phrase, "well planned is half done", also justifies itself in the peacekeeping context.

The number of irksome experiences from the recent history of peacekeeping shows that an accurate decision on the extension, alteration or termination of a peacekeeping operation's mandate presupposes reliable and objective information from the field. Similar observations were made also by the Brahimi Panel. Should the operation be conducted on the grounds of inadequate information and a vague mandate, the risk of getting entangled in a "mission creep" type of uncontrolled and hazardous adventure becomes acute.

As a representative of a troop-contributing country, I cannot emphasize enough the need to consult countries that contribute personnel to different operations. They should be involved at early stages of every phase of the decision-making process of the Security Council whenever the mandates of peace operations are extended, modified or terminated. Their role is important also in the exit phase since they have first-hand knowledge from the field. Their true participation in the decision-making process would facilitate the implementation, but also the termination, of a mission's mandate.

A post-conflict environment is vulnerable and most likely exposed to various internal or external pressures. Without the commitment to post-conflict peace-building of regional and local actors, particularly the former protagonists in the conflict, there will hardly be a successful exit strategy.

Whether post-conflict peace-building should be regarded as an element of peace operations or as a separate exercise is not only a matter of approach. Peace-building should be seen as an integral part of peacekeeping operations. It should be a part of the efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts. It is important to define and identify elements of peace-building before they are incorporated into the mandates of complex peace operations. This would facilitate a smooth transition from one phase to another in the continuum of peace operations and ensure continuing support for key elements of peace-building.

Peace-building measures and continuous monitoring are important tools for the United Nations and other international organizations to contribute to the success of the operation or, if necessary, to react and introduce appropriate measures in case of regress.

**The President**: The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Ahmad** (Pakistan): I would like to begin by expressing to you, Mr. President, our appreciation for convening today's debate. We are gratified that the Security Council has finally come round to addressing an issue on which discussion has been long overdue. It is an issue that is not only important, but deserves the utmost attention of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, in terms of actions, not words.

The image of peacekeeping operations is one of United Nations troops arriving in war-torn regions to

keep apart armies or warring groups and factions; to help in providing succour to the hapless, innocent victims of conflict; and to renew the hope that peace may finally take root where war or conflict has wreaked so much devastation. However, this image is flawed. More often than not, the best our peacekeepers end up doing is maintaining the status quo, eventually winding up their operation without making any contribution to the long-term resolution of the conflict. At worst, the fighting and the carnage resume as soon as the peacekeepers depart.

The fault lies not with the peacekeepers, but here, within this very Chamber. Too often, the Security Council decides on quick fixes rather than developing well-thought-out strategies to restore peace in conflict areas. Too often, it prefers to address the symptoms of conflict rather than its root causes. Too often, it fails to implement its own resolutions. And too often, it tries to appear to make and preserve peace without fulfilling or even addressing that responsibility in reality.

The United Nations Charter charges this Council with the responsibility of maintaining and preserving international peace and security, and provides the mechanisms for doing so. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have been honoured either in their neglect or in their selective application. History is full of examples that when the Council resolved to act it did so either by drawing up unrealistic plans of action — for example, authorizing mandates that could not be implemented — or by not implementing its own resolutions and decisions.

Mr. President, we welcome this initiative of yours and are in complete agreement with your apprehensions about exiting without strategy. You have in your letter to the Secretary-General correctly identified certain recent instances of complex intra-State peacekeeping operations that lacked long-term peace strategies, which led to the worsening rather than the improvement, of the situations. Similarly, in the case of many "traditional" peacekeeping operations, the presence of United Nations peacekeepers on the ground is not matched by the political resolve of the Security Council to bring about an end to long-term disputes or conflicts. In either case, there can be no credible exit strategy without a comprehensive plan that includes a solution.

The Brahimi report — to which references were made in the Council earlier today — briefly touches upon this issue by describing traditional peacekeeping operations as

> "relatively low cost and politically easier to maintain than to remove. However, they are also difficult to justify unless accompanied by serious and sustained peacemaking efforts ... to transform a ceasefire accord into a durable and lasting ... settlement." (*S/2000/809, para. 17*)

The solution to this problem is clearly not to terminate these traditional peacekeeping operations or impose arbitrary "sunset clauses" on them. Nor is it to continue, indefinitely, with the status quo. The answer lies in the United Nations continued engagement both on the ground and with the concerned actors to actively seek and find a political resolution of the dispute or crisis. Once a peacekeeping operation is in place the United Nations must ensure that the conflict has been resolved before it disengages itself. You are correct, Mr. President, in your assessment that ending a mission, or significantly reducing its military component, may well result in the situation's deteriorating, leading to a resumption of conflict. Exiting without achieving a durable peace or final settlement is simply unacceptable and costly.

Peacekeeping must be linked to conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building. For the United Nations, the objective — which, according to its Charter, is to maintain international peace and security — is clear enough. It should not be forgotten that peacekeeping is only one component of the overarching theme of peacemaking. Such an approach is essential for resolving all kinds of conflicts, be they intra-State or inter-State. Such an approach is as relevant to Sierra Leone or Kosovo as it is to the Middle East or Kashmir.

The Security Council cannot absolve itself of its responsibilities simply by deploying a peacekeeping mission in a conflict area. It is also required to come up with a sound and workable peace strategy that seeks to resolve the dispute by addressing its root causes and that is backed up by political will to resolve the dispute or conflict.

Postponing conflicts without resolving disputes does not mean peace; perpetuating a status quo which exacerbates suffering is not justice. And, if I may put it candidly, holding this thematic debate for the sake of debate is no strategy; it only reduces this Council to a debating club. Was this your intention, Mr. President,

in deciding to convene this meeting? Surely not! Words must be turned into action.

The Security Council must reassert its lost credibility and authority in fulfilment of its Charter obligations for the maintenance of peace and security. In implementing its decisions, it must not discriminate between regions or situations. It must act fairly, not selectively. It must always uphold principles of justice and international law.

The close of the last millennium, unfortunately, did not close all the chapters of the past century that were written in the blood of innocent people. The agenda of the Security Council, this very august body, and its debates of the forties, sixties, seventies and nineties bear witness to the lingering tragedy of Kashmir, where the era of foreign occupation and brutal repression has yet to end. The United Nations must redeem its pledge to the people of Kashmir by implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions. Kashmir today is not only a lurking threat to world peace and security but also a litmus test for the credibility of the United Nations. It has become the touchstone of the moral and legal underpinnings of the very United Nations system.

Peacekeeping is an important task, but the making and preservation of peace must not be left to the peacekeepers. This is the domain of the Security Council. The Council must find ways to address all conflict situations, without exception or discrimination, and try to resolve them.

Let us not have a recurrence of Sierra Leones in future. There should be "no exit without strategy", but the aim of this strategy must be to resolve disputes by addressing their root causes.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Belarus. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Ling** (Belarus) *(spoke in Russian)*: Allow me to welcome you as President of this meeting of the Security Council. The delegation of the Republic of Belarus is convinced that the topic you have proposed for our discussion will further enrich the significant contribution made by the Kingdom of the Netherlands towards rationalizing the work of the Council.

It is extremely important, in a discussion of this important topic, namely the Council's strategy for the termination or significant alteration of the mandate of peacekeeping missions, that all Member States of the United Nations be able to participate in an open and transparent atmosphere. We are convinced that this approach to the format of the meeting will make for the most effective analysis and development of acceptable approaches towards the further improvement of the work of the principle organ of the United Nations whose responsibility it is to maintain peace and security.

Today it is clear to all that the entire concept of United Nations peacekeeping is undergoing qualitative change. New types of conflicts — of a predominantly internal nature — cannot fail to affect the very basis of the activities of the missions established by Security Council resolutions. It is precisely in this connection that the termination phase of United Nations missions looks somewhat different now than it did at the very beginning of United Nations peacekeeping.

In practice, this means that we need to retain a United Nations presence after the end of the hostilities themselves, and there must be coordination by the United Nations of the process of post-conflict peace-building. Convincing examples of such activities already exist in Kosovo and in East Timor.

There are also a number of potential regions where this practice can be applied in the future. The concept of "mission completion" is thus undergoing some significant changes and requires that the United Nations make significant efforts for rehabilitation of a specific region. This reality is recognized by the Brahimi Panel. We think it is also important to note, in looking at these problems, that the considerations of countries participating in a mission must be taken into account, as well as the views of the Governments of the parties to the conflict. Belarus endorses the recommendations of the report, whereby the Executive Committee on Peace and Security should submit to the Secretary-General a plan for reinforcing the permanent capacity of the United Nations for working out peace-building strategies and for carrying out programmes in support of these strategies.

Discussing the problem today of determining exit strategies for United Nations missions, we cannot fail to ask ourselves: should we give thought only to an exit strategy? Or does it make sense to analyse an entry strategy? In other words, to consider the start of a peacekeeping operation. We see the key role to be played by the Security Council in improving the

process of winding up a mission as well as in improving the mandate of a United Nations mission so as to prevent, as far as possible, an unsuccessful exit from a crisis region.

The importance of the options offered by the Brahimi report are beyond doubt. We are convinced that the Council's resolution should be adopted only after all the various links in the chain — the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the field services — are convinced of the total willingness of Member States of the United Nations to carry out fully the mandate that has been established. Then, the mission can be completed successfully.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of India. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Sharma** (India): Mr. President, with true Dutch valour, you have chosen a theme for this open debate that goes to the heart of the problems that bedevil peacekeeping. Your courage demands frankness from us. I will speak frankly, but I would speak far too long if I went into every issue that should be addressed. I will focus, therefore, on only some key issues.

You have said that there should be no exit from a peacekeeping operation without a strategy, but there is renewed confusion over what peacekeeping is. Though five years ago, the euphoria of "An Agenda for Peace" was corrected, in the cold light of experience, in its "Supplement", the Council is being invited back into the same misty evangelism which caused havoc in several peacekeeping operations. Influential voices argue again that modern peacekeeping forces must be prepared to defeat the lingering forces of violence. This sounds plausible, but is in fact not doable, for a number of reasons. The Council will set up peacekeeping operations for an inevitable fall if it goes this route, from which there is no exit without embarrassment.

As an example, the Council has just set up a classic peacekeeping operation to monitor a ceasefire between two countries. All of us trust and hope that the ceasefire will hold, but if it unravels the Council will surely not expect that peacekeeping operation to use force against either party to coerce it back to the status quo. Instead, as it has each time war has broken out in the Middle East in an area where a peacekeeping operation was deployed, the Council would authorize its immediate evacuation. This would not mean that the credibility of the operation or of the Security Council or of the United Nations had been called into question. It would simply be to accept that peacekeeping could do no more.

However, in Sierra Leone, the Council sets mandates that involve the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone's going into action against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to force it back to the Lomé Peace Agreement. In both operations, the United Nations is interposed between parties to a conflict. For a peacekeeping operation, there is in a sense no difference between an inter-State and an intrastate conflict. Impartiality and consent are as essential in one situation as they are in the other. We urge the Council to bear this in mind when it formulates, and even more when it alters, peacekeeping mandates. As any experienced troop contributor knows, in peacekeeping it is best not to veer from classicism to romanticism.

Throughout the first 40 years of peacekeeping, the United Nations followed an unwritten rule in peacekeeping, spelled out by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly when the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first peacekeeping operation, was set up. As the chapter on UNEF in *The Blue Helmets*, a book published by the Department of Public Information, recalls:

> "Troops from the permanent members of the Security Council or from any country which, for geographical and other reasons, might have a special interest in the conflict would be excluded." (*3rd ed., p. 42*)

The permanent members did not participate because it was nominally at the end of their proxy wars that the United Nations sent in its peacekeepers. Neighbours and regional Powers were excluded because, by definition, they could not be disinterested. The United Nations understood, quite rightly, that successful peacekeeping could be carried out only by countries that were neutral and had no interests of their own to pursue.

This cardinal rule has repeatedly been broken in recent years, with the United Nations now co-opting regional players, though it is in the nature of politics that they are often part of the problem, not of the solution. This has had repercussions on more than one peacekeeping operation, but it seems that lessons have not been learned.

Of the three case studies listed in your paper, Sir, the United Nations experience in Liberia was studied in depth in the book published last year by the United Nations University, *Peacekeepers, Politicians and Warlords*. That made the telling point that intrastate conflicts almost invariably spill over boundaries. Displaced populations crossed borders; refugees became pawns in a larger game; warlords used contiguous foreign territories as safe havens; and, as a result, in these, even more than in the earlier interstate wars, neighbouring States and regional Powers became a part of the conflict.

It is in Africa that the Council has leaned most towards regional solutions. The study published earlier this year by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, tellingly named *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, makes the point that many Africans believe this is so because the major Powers do not want to get involved in Africa. Regionalism is a self-serving way out, but it makes peacekeeping enormously difficult for the United Nations and for countries like India that have participated in almost every operation in Africa.

Africans see the problem clearly. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, whose neighbours have been drawn into the conflict, the mini-summit of the parties to the conflict in Tripoli, held on 7 and 8 November, agreed as the first point in their communiqué that "a neutral African force shall be deployed immediately in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". By definition, none of the regional countries now embroiled in the conflict can be brought into a United Nations peacekeeping operation either and the United Nations has not, for once, made the mistake of inviting them to re-hat their forces in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It is truly a pity that this eminently sensible practice has been so unwisely ignored elsewhere in Africa. Regional interests will force out the disinterested; peacekeeping in these circumstances becomes a flawed instrument.

Almost every peacekeeping operation is now predicated on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), but, unlike the DDR with which we are familiar here, what it produces is often of dubious quality. Based on the Liberian experience, the United Nations University study asks if disarmament should be a priority when the demobilization of traumatized fighters into a scarred society creates its own problems and reintegration is impossible without economic opportunities. It argues that the insistence on disarmament was not helpful in Liberia and was ineffective. Without either security or employment, young men did not give up the weapons on which their lives and livelihoods depended. In Sierra Leone, disarmament was what triggered the RUF's return to violence.

The key, possibly, is for the Council to dispatch at the very outset a peacekeeping force so large and well-armed that it would not only provide a sense of security to all, but be clearly so strong that no faction could take it on. Only a force like that, on the lines of those sent by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into the Balkans before the United Nations took over, would persuade faction leaders to disarm. However, so far the Council has not been generous at the outset, only authorizing deployment in the numbers and the quality needed after a crisis has set in. This has truly been a false economy; the cost has been paid by the United Nations, by peacekeepers and most of all by the civilian victims of resumed conflict.

The farewell address to the Security Council a few days ago of the High Commissioner for Refugees highlighted the contradictions between the needs of peacekeeping and those of humanitarian relief.

Agencies that provide relief arrive in a theatre of conflict well before the peacekeepers do. Throughout the conflict, they have to come to a modus vivendi with the parties. Their operations may be skeletal, like their beneficiaries, but they serve a vital function. Once peace is restored, they want to expand their operations. Why, they ask reasonably, should the local population have a stake in peace if peace brings them no immediate benefits? And they expect peacekeeping forces, once they arrive, to ensure that relief operations on a much larger scale can be carried on unimpeded.

Unfortunately, that is where problems begin. The warlords believe that if they lose control of who gets what in their areas of influence, their power will fade away; they resist spurts in relief activity that exclude them. If the peacekeeping forces are conduits for the delivery of aid, warlords see them as adversaries. If the peacekeeping forces decline to help, relief agencies complain bitterly that they are of no use, and pressures mount in the Council to issue mandates that explicitly

ask for the force to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. In either case, the peacekeeping operation is drawn into a mire.

The Council's humanitarian impulse is natural, but conducting humanitarian relief through peacekeeping undermines both humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. Indian peacekeeping units invariably provide humanitarian relief, judging local conditions in the light of experience. This gives them entrée into local society, makes the peacekeeping operation visible and acceptable, and slowly weans the population away from the warlords. However, a rush to bring in relief, including through military convoys, usually leads to more problems. The crises that erupt ensure that the aid providers leave, and the peacekeepers get bogged down with no exit in sight.

Citing the diamond embargoes in Angola and Sierra Leone, your paper, Mr. President, asks the Council to use all forms of leverage at its disposal to assist peace operations implement their mandates. It is debatable whether those decisions are within the Council's mandate; it is also by no means settled that they indeed assist a peacekeeping operation. What is clear is that, in Sierra Leone, the diamond embargo required the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to take on unforeseen, very ambitious and dangerous tasks for which peacekeepers are not best suited. As the Council will have seen from the note verbale of 16 October 2000 from the Permanent Mission of Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2000/998), conflict diamonds were shut down there only after the Government of Angola wrested control of the diamond mining areas from UNITA. In Sierra Leone, it remains to be seen whether the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) will actually surrender control of the diamond fields; if it does not, and if UNAMSIL is asked to take them back by force, the peacekeeping operation will be pursuing a radically altered objective.

In Afghanistan, the war is believed to be fueled by the sale of illicit drugs. So too are some conflicts in Central America. It is an odd paradox that, because those are products that are wholly illicit, the Council has made no effort whatsoever to proscribe them as "conflict drugs". There is "conflict timber" in West Africa as well, and "conflict cobalt" in Central Africa. What will drive Council action? The Council cannot stop all illicit economic activity believed to drive conflict; the temptation is to fall back on tokenism. The end result will not be to assist a peacekeeping operation, but to lay upon it tasks that it cannot discharge.

Your paper, Mr. President, asks the Council to so structure peacekeeping operations that they leave a lasting peace behind. That is a tall order. Mrs. Ogata explained the problem very well: there is a gap, she reminded the Council, between emergency relief and long-term development and reconstruction programmes, and, during that gap, societies can unravel again and conflicts resume. Is the answer, then, to maintain peacekeeping operations until reconstruction is well on its way? That too is unsustainable, for reasons also explained by Mrs. Ogata.

Development agencies are slow to come once a crisis has ended and once the country is no longer fashionable. In fact, experience has shown that, in that respect, a peacekeeping operation becomes the victim of its own success. As peace takes hold, media attention dwindles, and with it donor interest fades. That was the case in Haiti, for instance, one of the case studies in your paper, Sir.

Before peace takes hold, all donors argue, reasonably, that they want to see a semblance of security before they invest. But without investment there are no jobs, therefore no demobilization or reintegration, and therefore no real security — and in turn no lasting peace. However, when the peacekeeping operation creates the conditions for peace to return, the absence of crisis leads to an absence of donor interest. This vicious cycle has to be broken, but peacekeeping cannot do it. Post-conflict peace-building cannot be done through peacekeeping. It is not in the Council's mandate, and it is much too ambitious an undertaking for a peacekeeping operation.

Somalia best illustrates the role the media plays in Council decisions. Gruesome television coverage first got the United Nations into Somalia, and then forced it out. Emotions are stirred by television, but emotion does not make for sound policy, particularly when, as a result, pressure mounts for quick action. Very few members of the Security Council are major troop contributors, and there is a tendency to throw peacekeeping operations at any tragedy that presents itself on screen. That is what leads to the phenomenon of "mission creep": changes in the mandate and tasks of a peacekeeping operation, responding to media and

political pressure, that ask it to do what either cannot or should not be done.

On this matter, the permanent and the non-permanent members share equal responsibility. Very often, the non-permanent members, most of which do not have the independent intelligence-gathering ability of some of the permanent members, are even more dependent on, and swayed by, overwrought media reports, forcing the Council to act in haste, with unfortunate consequences for peacekeeping operations. In Bosnia, responding to media coverage, the non-permanent members insisted on the designation of "safe havens" which, as Srebrenica proved, were neither safe nor havens; some realized, too late, that they had been wrong. In Sierra Leone, earlier this year, the non-permanent members asked for a change to a Chapter-VII mandate as soon as the crisis erupted, even though the troop contributors knew that this would have unfortunate consequences.

The Council needs to consult far more widely than it does now before it changes a mandate. The troop contributors are key players who know the situation on the ground better than most, who are in daily touch with developments and who can advise on the basis of practical experience on what needs to be done, but they are rarely consulted by the Council, or if they are, their advice is rarely taken seriously. In any sensible operation run by a national Government, policy would be changed only in the light of reports from the field. I urge the Council to keep up a meaningful dialogue with troop contributors. They are the ones doing the job, and professional forces want to make sure that they do it right, and that they leave once they have done it. Their advice will be sound, objective and unbiased; it will serve the Council well.

Let me say that it is also essential that a peacekeeping operation should not be dragged out when it no longer has a useful role to play; it should leave before the host makes it clear that it has overstayed its welcome. That would be an exit without dignity. The vast majority of the operations set up over the past 50 years have been wound up with, by and large, the countries concerned none the worse for it. Peacekeeping should not become a crutch or a means of establishing that a conflict continues; it runs the risk then of becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The case histories in your paper, Mr. President, could be usefully rounded out by the Council's considering the lessons that should be drawn from the winding down of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola. In both instances the Governments concerned decided at a certain point in time that the peacekeeping operations served no purpose. They welcomed the United Nations presence in their countries, but no longer headed by a peacekeeping operation. Neither the Secretariat nor the Council wanted that. Again, if the Council is honest with itself, it will concede that pique had some play here.

Since the Council decides when a peacekeeping operation will be set up and when it will be wound down, it does not like to have a beneficiary decide what is best for it. *Pari passu*, this is also the attitude of the Secretariat. Thankfully, in both Angola and Rwanda good sense prevailed and the peacekeeping operations were withdrawn when the Governments concerned made it clear that they no longer wanted them there. This too is a lesson that the Council must learn: exit with humility.

If a peacekeeping operation is to be brought to a successful end, without any apocalyptic codas, we believe the following principles will serve the Council well. Before setting up an operation, it should satisfy itself that the terms and the time-frame of the peace agreements the United Nations is supposed to monitor and help to implement are reasonable. The Council should consult widely in the region, and within the country, to ensure that the agreement is truly supported by all key players. The Council should explain to all parties just what the role of the peacekeeping operation will be, and get their concurrence. The Council should choose as troop contributors those without a vested interest in the country concerned and which have armed forces that are professional, apolitical, disciplined and well equipped. Sending inadequate forces is as self-defeating as sending armed forces accustomed to usurping power at home to promote democratic settlements abroad.

The Council should also consult closely with troop contributors at every stage of the operation and base its decisions on their advice. It should deploy in sufficient force so that the operation can immediately and visibly, through its presence, provide security where there has been none. Only once a general sense of security has been established and all factions are confident that if they disarm they will not become vulnerable, should the Council move to undertake

disarmament, demobilization and integration at a pace with which all parties are comfortable. Through its calming presence, the Council should create an environment in which the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be steadily improved, without either forcing the pace or becoming directly involved in the face of possible opposition to the delivery of assistance. Once disarmament is almost complete and confidence in the impartiality of the peacekeeping operation has been established, it can, if needed, move towards actions that are described as aid to civil authority.

Either when an inclusive political arrangement is in place or when a Government firmly in power — with whose consent the peacekeeping operation had been established — asks it to leave, should the operation be wound up, although the other tasks of the United Nations would continue. Post-conflict peace-building would continue over many years, but the peacekeeping operation would be its precursor. It should normally be long gone by the time this process gets into full swing.

We wish all success to the Council in its tasks. We thank you, Mr. President, for being present in person today at this debate. I presume that you are representing all the other Permanent Representatives in the Council today.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Slovakia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Tomka** (Slovakia): I wish to begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. My delegation also wishes to join previous speakers in thanking you, Mr. President, for convening this important open debate on exit strategies for United Nations peacekeeping operations, the timing of which could, perhaps, not have be better. We commend the delegation of the Netherlands for preparing a thought-provoking paper for today's discussion.

We must recognize that, at the threshold of the new millennium, a number of countries and regions still remain afflicted and threatened by conflicts and tensions. There are no more noble goals for the international community and the United Nations than the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development. Timely and appropriate response to conflict situations is essential in order to prevent the deterioration of situations and achieve the noble goal of durable peace. However, one must agree that a desired outcome cannot be achieved without the right strategy.

We share the view — and recent experience has confirmed it — that peacekeeping operations, as one of the fundamental forms of international assistance in today's conflict situations, can achieve a positive result only if they are based on a clearly defined and achievable mandate that reflects the requirements of the situation under consideration. Only a well designed and developed strategy for United Nations peacekeeping involvement that includes the provision of an adequate mandate and appropriate resources for the operation can bring about success and strengthen the credibility of the United Nations in its peace efforts around the world.

We believe that establishing a clear mandate for peacekeeping operations is the primary responsibility of the Security Council, with the strong support of the Secretariat. In this regard, the Secretariat and the Security Council should effectively use the necessary and appropriate means available to them. Those means include, among other things, fact-finding missions, missions by the Security Council, and special representatives of the Secretary-General to obtain proper and reliable information reflecting the real situation on the ground. The information obtained should be frankly discussed with the aim of candidly and openly pointing out existing problems and seeking out appropriate tools to address the problems and resolve conflict situations. We believe that such an approach could lead to a determination of the objectives that are essential for the establishment of a clear mandate for a proposed mission. At the same time, this could avoid unnecessary problems and diminish the need to change a mission's mandate or, even, to withdraw the mission before it achieves its goals.

It is evident that a mission should be given an achievable mandate, together with sufficient resources to be able to carry out its objectives. We are of the view that the establishment of such a mandate should be based on close and interactive cooperation between the Security Council, as the decision maker, and the troop contributing countries participating in the implementation of the mandate of peacekeeping operations. However, in order to proceed in that fashion and to be able to support the good intentions

underlying the deployment of United Nations missions, Member States must be able and willing to provide troops that are adequately prepared for the tasks assigned, thereby also supporting the ability of the United Nations to carry out the tasks it is asked to perform.

In that regard, we share and support the view that, where feasible, Member States should enter into effective mutual cooperation that will enable them to form adequately trained and equipped troops. We also encourage the Secretariat to assist Member States and to facilitate such cooperation. With active participation by the Secretariat, this concept should also be applied to the pre-deployment training of potential troop contributors, if necessary, as part of an overall strategy for mission deployment.

There is no doubt that the peace process is not complete and that the cooperation and assistance of the international community cannot stop after peace is restored. Durable results and lasting and self-sustaining peace and development cannot be achieved and maintained without adequate follow-up. This assumes the clear and smooth transition of peacekeeping operations to post-conflict peace-building that addresses all factors and needs related to consolidation and development and thereby maintains the momentum developed by the peacekeeping operation. We share the view that the Security Council must remain engaged throughout all phases of this process.

The United Nations has a variety of tools at its disposal for conflict prevention and resolution. While we welcome and support every new and innovative approach that can enhance our efforts towards peace, in addressing the particular situation we should open the existing tool box wide and take out all appropriate tools as the situation requires.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Ireland. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement.

**Ms. Murnaghan** (Ireland): Mr. President, like others, I would like to commend you, Mr. President, for scheduling this open debate during the Netherlands presidency. This is an imaginative, and as many people have underlined, a very timely initiative.

We have listened carefully to previous interventions and we share many of the points made about the need for better conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building strategies, clear mandates, precise objectives, the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to the kind of conflicts which have arisen in recent years and strengthening of the Secretariat's capacity, in particular, to assist the Council in its decision-making.

The title which you have chosen for your paper, Mr. President, forces us to look carefully at how we use the words in question, and you are quite right to draw attention to the overtones of the term "exit strategy". A good exit strategy for a peacekeeping operation, it seems to us, should be not just one which offers a clear prospect of sustained peace, but one in which the causes of the original problem have been addressed in such a way as to give reasonable promise that the problem will not recur. This implies that a good exit strategy is also a good entry strategy where the problem has been thoroughly analysed, the parties are ready to accept international intervention, the causes of the problem are addressed — to use the formula of the Brahimi report — in the context of a clear, credible and achievable mandate and appropriate peace-building measures are put in place so that the peacekeeping operation can withdraw, leaving behind a process which, with the continued assistance of the international community, through other means perhaps, will sustain peace.

However, we are talking, particularly in the post-cold-war period, of very complex conflicts which are multifaceted and have their roots as much in economic, political and social conditions as in purely military rivalries. Each problem has its own characteristics, and in the real world it is often difficult to see one's way clear to the desired outcome.

The very notion of rapid response, where the international community would intervene at short notice in critical situations, implies that the conditions necessary for bringing the interventions to an end may not be very clear at the outset. The immediate imperative to save lives, when the window of opportunity to do so exists, may well have to take precedence at a given moment over careful analysis. The analysis must, of course, be done, but we may not have the luxury of waiting for its completion before we must take action.

Security Council missions to areas of operation, therefore, will not only provide first-hand information, but will allow the Council to round out its assessment

of conditions on the ground and the needs of the situation, including potential revision of mandates. So, in this regard, we welcome very much, as some other speakers have done, the sending of Security Council missions to areas of operation.

Again, in an ideal world, the members of the Security Council and the international community in general would share an analysis of the origins and nature of the threat to international peace and security in any particular situation. But it is inevitable that individual members of the international community will look at specific problems from their own perspectives. But despite any differing interests or perspectives which they may hold, which may well cause them to grade threats to peace and security in accordance with different scales, they nonetheless must do all in their power to respond to the needs of specific situations on the basis of a common understanding. The Council therefore should draw up mandates based primarily on analysis and not other considerations.

The issue of costs may sometimes give rise to a desire to bring a peacekeeping operation to a possibly premature end. This is always unfortunate, in our view. The international community must always be prepared to contribute the necessary resources that will allow a peacekeeping operation to be brought, where possible, to a successful conclusion. This, however, does not mean — and we would be naïve to propose such a thing — that cost considerations are not relevant. It is painful to Member States, whose taxpayers are contributing to a peacekeeping operation and are contributing, in many cases, large amounts of funding for development cooperation, to see parties refusing to engage meaningfully in negotiations for peace or resisting the effective implementation of a peace process. It is particularly painful to see parties and leaders exploiting a troubled situation in order to benefit personally from resources which should properly be used for the benefit of the people who are suffering from war and civil strife.

So, in summary, an approach purely motivated by cost is not an appropriate one. But this is not to say, of course, that an appropriate regard for cost should not be part of a solution to a problem.

The world is not perfect. If it were we would not need peacekeeping. Our approach to individual situations will always have to take this into account.

We agree fully with others who spoke earlier that we need a more fully articulated analysis of situations and, on occasion perhaps, a greater sharing of that analysis by the members of the Security Council and the international community in general. However, not all situations will be amenable to such an approach, and to be practical, therefore, we have to take account of the problems which arise in a world of differing interests and perceptions; but equally we should be on our guard against allowing ourselves to be paralysed by them.

These are just some reflections that have arisen out of our consideration of some of the points which were made earlier in the debate.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Croatia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Šimonović** (Croatia): It is my pleasure to thank the Kingdom of the Netherlands for organizing this open debate on United Nations missions' so-called exit strategy. We cannot agree more with the statement that the term "exit strategy" is unclear and may be misleading. We therefore wish to commend you, Mr. President, for your initiative to explore the uncharted territory that lies between the formal end of a United Nations mission and the fulfilment of the mission's objectives.

We appreciate the approach the Dutch delegation has taken in preparing and distributing in advance a reference paper on the theme "No exit without strategy" for today's debate. Its conceptual part and its three case studies contain probing questions, as well as a compilation of lessons learned regarding the creation, modification and, especially, termination of operational mandates. So far, a number of these lessons have not been necessarily recommended for implementation, let alone implemented.

In this regard, we, too, consider today's exercise an important contribution to filling in a missing link in the Brahimi report on the reform of United Nations peace operations, a link that cannot be provided by the report's call for "clear, credible and achievable mandates". (*S/2000/809, annex III, para. 4*) In our view, as derived from our experience of having hosted five peace operations in our country, we are convinced that the Security Council's mandates must also favour and advance the end objectives of achieving self-sustainable peace. This goal, of course, requires a well-

thought-out strategy and unwavering commitment by all the parties involved.

In this regard, Croatia takes pride, together with the United Nations, for having persevered in carrying out a comprehensive strategy for a successful termination of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). To recall, at the time when UNTAES was launched, the mandated area of its operation in Croatia was still under occupation.

From the outset, the Security Council set a clear, credible and realistic mandate, based on and corresponding to the 1995 agreement of the parties involved. Thus, in its resolution of 15 November 1996 the Council confirmed the two-year deadline for the termination of the Mission. In this case, the finality of the mandate provided both focus and discipline to anticipate and then carry out a number of mandated tasks, most notably the disarmament programme. This initiative was not only launched early in the operation but also was completed swiftly and in parallel with the innovative manner of the weapons buy-back scheme.

Of equal importance were the other two elements of the three-prong UNTAES success strategy: follow-on security assistance and political missions that ensued upon the termination of the United Nations operation, and national strategy and policy measures regarding the rehabilitation and reintegration of the former combatants. The follow-on mission of 180 civilian police monitors, for a single period of nine months, was authorized by a Security Council resolution of 19 December 1997, at Croatia's own request.

Another element, both welcomed and encouraged by the Security Council and later monitored by a regional security organization, was the development and implementation of the Republic of Croatia's national strategy of peaceful reintegration of the region.

From today's perspective, one can claim that UNTAES had all the right prerequisites in place, most importantly the cooperation of the host country. Therefore, the argument goes, UNTAES was both a unique and not particularly challenging operation. We respectfully disagree. We feel that the United Nations should be given credit for its part in the job well done. We are also convinced that credit is due to the Security Council. The proper initial formulation of the United Nations mandate and its subsequent modifications to fit the evolving realities on the ground were part of a well-defined strategy to usher in the final objectives: peaceful reintegration and sustainable peace in Eastern Slavonia.

Because the Security Council has neither lost sight of nor appeared hesitant regarding this objective, it was able to act in an anticipatory and flexible fashion in the evolving process of the implementation of the desired objectives. In such a manner, the Council did not waver from its course and did not send confusing signals or block the process of normalization in its tracks, but it was able to recognize the encouraging steps on the ground and thus strengthen the process so that it could run its course to successful completion.

Croatia is currently hosting the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), the last remaining United Nations operation on its soil. Since 1992 the Prevlaka area has been under the United Nations monitoring mandate. Over the years, the attempts by the parties, even at the local level between the Croatian and Montenegrin authorities, to resolve the security issue of Prevlaka have been frustrated by the unrelenting refusal of the former Milosevic regime to let go of its expansionist policies.

As we have witnessed elsewhere, such policies failed disastrously but were finally defeated just a few months ago. Nevertheless, Croatia has never given up the goal of re-establishing normality and bringing prosperity to the entire area under the United Nations monitoring mandate. Together with our Montenegrin neighbours, we have jointly committed ourselves to a peaceful resolution of the security issue of Prevlaka at the highest level.

Moreover, we have drawn concrete and actionable plans to attract investors to this pristine part of the Croatian and Montenegrin coastal area to build complementary tourist resorts on both sides of the international border. We have also agreed to jointly fund the construction of the customs and other border-crossing facilities at Prevlaka. Part of this project should be carried out under the auspices of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. We have faith that the new democratic authorities in Belgrade will continue with their constructive approach towards their neighbours, including in this matter as well.

We are grateful to the Secretary-General for having recognized, despite the crudeness of the

UNMOP mandate, other acts of normalization on the ground. We feel that the time is ripe for the Security Council to advance a comprehensive "exit strategy" for this United Nations operation. It is time for the Council to assist the process of normalization further by recognizing the repeatedly certified fact that the security situation in Prevlaka has been stable for years now and by imposing a clear deadline for the termination of the mission. Such a decision will be based on an enabling strategy to reinforce sustainable peace and thus focus energies on returning prosperity to a once thriving tourist industry of the Dubrovnik area and the Bay of Kotor.

I thank you again, Mr. President, for bringing a much needed spotlight to the often missing link between the end of the mission and the mission's objectives.

**The President**: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Rwanda. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Mutaboba** (Rwanda): This is yet again another opportunity to talk of an important matter that is relevant to the historical successes and failures of our Organization in general and of this Council in particular. My delegation wishes to congratulate you, Mr. President, for your inspiring paper and for calling this debate. My delegation believes that this topic had been conveniently ignored or left out during previous meetings of the Council, not because members did not think it has meaning, but probably because the topic itself carries with it the need for a lot of introspection and therefore more responsibilities to align and failures to account for.

From peacekeeping to peace-building and from peace-building to nation-building, a lot of things are meant to happen and decisions must be taken. However, things do not always happen as they should, and when they do, consequent decisions are not taken to make sure that such a rich background of experience can serve as a basis for not repeating the same mistakes. There are many examples to illustrate this.

The "no exit without strategy" debate therefore comes as a good opportunity for all members to tell each other the truth and nothing but the truth, and to teach or learn from one another for practical and obvious reasons. If there is an exit to refer to, then it should refer to "let's go, job well done", and not refer to a negative and cowardly ending of saying "Thank God we have an easy way out. Let's get out fast".

It is imperative that members have and show the same sense of responsibility in whatever you are doing in this Chamber and in each peacekeeping situation you are called to mount and lead to a successful exit. To do so you need right strategies, and right strategies stem from clear thinking, clear and achievable mandates, adequate logistics and, most of all, a sustained political will to take the entire membership of our Organization on board.

If a member suggests or decides to go here or there, just ask yourselves: For what purpose? What do you want to achieve? Why this and not what we agreed upon before? This systematic way of thinking, step by step and phase by phase, cannot lead us to disasters or failures. On the contrary, it will lead us to successes, and that is what we collectively want to see happening, with everyone's assistance wherever the action has to take place.

Discrepancies in our recent history naturally lead to double standards and limited popularity of the work carried out by our Organization. While congratulating the Security Council for the rapidity with which peacekeeping forces have been put together for Ethiopia and Eritrea, I wish to remind everyone that it is occurring well after Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Much as none of the peacekeeping forces can expect to enjoy a soft landing in any given country, it is certain that with good strategies, those forces can avoid the worst and do the best job of all.

Strategies are defined by clear objectives and mandates, by adequate logistics and by political will, the lack of which has caused, and is still causing, repeated failures. Yes, we should exit. But the Council must ask itself whether it has done what it had to do and whether it is satisfied with its achievements. If the answer is "no", then I am afraid that all strategies ought to be thrown on the table and revised. The Brahimi report undoubtedly shows that the situations in Srebrenica and Rwanda could have been avoided altogether.

My delegation hopes that, even though our loved ones cannot be brought back, the lessons learned will at least enable us to devise sound strategies to prevent similar tragedies from occurring in the future. Words alone do not serve any purpose. They have to be

followed by actions. Peace will then mean more to people and to the world. Assistance for development in post-conflict countries such as Rwanda is a necessity, and such assistance has rightly been proposed by reports on Rwanda, Srebrenica and other situations. Failing to reduce poverty and ignorance will breed injustice and result in a fragile peace, and we will have to start all over again. From this Chamber and the Secretariat of our Organization, we need strategies that can help us to exit in a dignified manner.

**The President:** I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Netherlands.

It has been a pleasure to listen to the many excellent statements that we have heard in the course of this day. One reason must have been that several of them started with compliments addressed to the Dutch presidency. In order to save time, I did not acknowledge those kind words as President. I should now like to thank representatives for all of them.

Today's debate has demonstrated the relevance of the issue of Security Council decision-making on mission closure and mission transition and the interests that Member States take in that issue. It has been a very useful contribution to the overall exercise of improving United Nations peace operations, the main part of which consists, of course, of the Brahimi report and the various discussions about that report. Clearly, today's subject deserves a much more thorough study than the Netherlands has been able to supply in its brief discussion paper, which was, after all, intended only to challenge minds and loosen tongues. I think the paper has served it purpose, and now we must shift to a more operational mode.

It is clear that an open meeting of the Security Council does not lend itself to consultations on the most effective follow-up of our debate. I will therefore put the issue on the agenda of the Security Council in consultations of the whole. Those delegations that are not members of the Council but have concrete suggestions regarding that follow-up, are welcome to submit them to the Council President or, for that matter, to any other Council member. Their ideas will certainly be taken into account.

One recurring theme during today's debate was the importance of ensuring a smooth transition from the conflict phase to the post-conflict peace-building phase. This requirement may seem self-evident, but in many instances there appears to be a gap between those two phases, which needs to be filled. A graphic illustration of this phenomenon is the situation in Guinea-Bissau, a country which finds itself at a very fragile post-conflict stage. Later this month — 29 November, to be exact — the Dutch presidency has scheduled an open briefing on Guinea-Bissau, which will be chaired by the Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands. It will provide an excellent opportunity to apply elements of today's debate to the case of Guinea-Bissau. Later this week, my delegation will send out a draft presidential statement to members of the Council with an explanatory note on the purpose of the meeting.

As I realize that after this long debate all of us are secretly longing for an exit, I will now resume my function as President of the Council.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

*The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.*